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This chapter focuses on how competition and consumer protection issues might be
relevant and apply to a key Indigenous industry. In discussions between the ACCC,
ATSIC and CAEPR it was agreed that a focus on the Indigenous visual arts and
crafts industry was desirable for a variety of reasons:
! it is more distinctly Indigenous than any other ‘industry’
! it has a high public profile
! it is of social and cultural significance both to Indigenous and other Australians
! it is of economic significance.1
However, it should be noted at the outset that, for a variety of reasons, many of
the arts organisations that assist in the marketing of Indigenous art, especially art
from remote communities, also undertake a variety of non-market activities on
behalf of Indigenous producers. These organisations have social as well as
economic functions—in many cases they have been established because of market
failure.
This chapter begins with a general description of the Indigenous visual arts
industry and the nature of competition within it. It then outlines the sections of the
TPA that would appear, a priori, to apply to this industry. A discussion follows,
based on the available empirical evidence of the likely points of articulation
between the TPA and the industry. Both anecdotal and published case material are
considered. The chapter ends by considering areas where the ACCC might play a
role in ameliorating some of the competition and consumer problems that might
arise for this industry. It should be noted that the discussion and analysis presented
here is preliminary. It will become apparent that there is very limited statistical
information about the industry.
1 Throughout this chapter reference to ‘Indigenous visual art’ will refer to Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander art.
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Many of the issues raised are not new and many have been previously
documented. There is a substantial body of literature that deals with authenticity,
cultural integrity, copyright, pricing, the market and the structure of the industry.
Of particular significance is the ATSIC-sponsored The Art and Craft Centre Story
(ACCS) (see Wright 1999, 2000a; Wright & Morphy 2000), and the earlier review
of the industry, The Aboriginal Arts and Crafts Industry: Report of the Review
Committee (Altman 1989) (see also Altman & Taylor 1990; Janke 1998; Loveday &
Cooke 1983; Mercer 1997; Pascoe 1981).
It became clear early in the research that the lack of general information about
Indigenous arts necessitated a focus on some particular aspect of this broad-
ranging industry. Consequently, the focus throughout has been on the visual arts,
sometimes termed ‘arts and crafts’ or handcrafts. Boundaries in the arts are difficult
to demarcate clearly and one of the issues canvassed was manufactured product
that has Indigenous design but may involve non-Indigenous collaboration.
The policy context
The Indigenous visual arts industry has a relatively short history dating back to the
early 1970s. The establishment and growth of the industry has been discussed in
some detail elsewhere (Altman 1988; Altman 1989; Altman 2000c; Peterson
1983). One salient issue for this research has been to provide some explanation of
the somewhat ambiguous and still unresolved role of government in the
establishment and maintenance of the industry.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a recognition in the formulation of
policy that Indigenous (then Aboriginal) arts and crafts might provide a means to
combine cultural maintenance with economic activity for both Indigenous and
national benefit. This was linked to an increase in art and craft production by
Indigenous people, and in part to a growth in domestic and inbound tourism and a
demand for ‘authentic’ Indigenous cultural product. Since much of this was
produced in extremely remote communities inaccessible to tourists, there was a
recognition and acceptance that collecting and marketing entailed such high
transportation (transactions) costs that the industry required government
assistance. Most remote communities lacked institutional mechanisms for collecting
and distributing such a product, so new institutions—community-controlled art
centres—were established. At the same time, government sponsored a wholesaling
and retailing enterprise, Aboriginal Arts and Crafts Pty Ltd. At its peak, this
company had a warehouse in Sydney and retail outlets in Sydney, Perth,
Melbourne, Alice Springs and Darwin (see Altman 1989; Peterson 1983).
Initially, much of this industry support was provided by the newly established
Australia Council and its Aboriginal Arts Board under the cultural policy umbrella,
but increasingly in the 1980s the federal Aboriginal affairs bureaucracy also
66 Competition and consumer issues for Indigenous Australians
c h a p t e r 4
subsidised the industry through an unspecified amalgam of cultural and economic
policy. In the early 1990s, ATSIC established a special program, the National Arts
and Crafts Industry Support Strategy (NACISS) to support the industry, with the
Australia Council now taking a secondary role. The government-supported
wholesaling and retailing operation was wound down, but NACISS saw a more
substantial and consistent support of about 40 community-based art centres
(Altman 2000a; Mercer 1997; Wright 1999).
The policy rationale underlying the provision of industry support changed
somewhat in the context of a major review of the industry undertaken in 1989
(Altman 1989). This review argued that there were sound economic and cultural
reasons for government to support this industry since it had demonstrated rapid
growth between the early 1970s and 1988. This view was reinforced by other
policy reviews and initiatives around that time, including the Aboriginal
Employment Development Policy (Commonwealth of Australia 1987), a review of
the Aboriginal Homelands movement (Blanchard 1987) and the Royal Commission
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Johnston 1991). The important link between
cultural maintenance and economic opportunity was recognised by all these
inquiries.
These policy framework issues are important. While the industry has grown very
rapidly over the past three decades according to available statistics, very few
community-controlled art centres have become financially independent. This is
partly because transaction costs remain high despite improvements in
communications, and partly because few art centres are of sufficient size to
sponsor the costs of collecting and marketing from operating surpluses. Those few
art centres that have become financially independent are located adjacent to
robust tourist destinations (and markets) such as Alice Springs or Uluru (Ayers
Rock). Uncertainty over whether government industry support is cultural or
economic (or both) still persists. To the extent that the support is economic in
nature, it is unclear whether it is based on the rationale of ‘infant industry’ or
‘market failure’ (or both).
The continuing subvention of community-controlled art centres raises important
issues that will be discussed further below. These include the relationships between
producers and ‘their’ art centres, and the potential for or desirability of competition
within communities where market failure arguments have resulted in government
subsidisation of arts collection and marketing.
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The value of the industry
There are no comprehensive data on the Indigenous arts industry as a whole, and
the limited statistical data that do exist are too incompatible to provide the basis
for an accurate understanding of the market. This is partly because there is no
instrument that is appropriately structured to collect such information, but it also
reflects the contested definition of Indigenous art. There are debates about
whether the ethnicity of the producer or the cultural form of the product is more
important to its definition, and about where the boundaries of the category lie
within a broad spectrum that has ‘fine art’ at one extreme and ‘tourist art’ at the
other.
ATSIC’s Cultural Industry Strategy (ATSIC 1997) estimated and annual total value
of about $200 million for the industry, but this figure is unsubstantiated. More
recently, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has estimated commercial sales of
Indigenous art at $36 million (ABS 2001: 3), but this has been challenged on a
number of grounds as a probable underestimate (Altman 2001a). The figure is
probably somewhere between $100 million and $300 million. The more
conservative estimate is based on the commercial galleries survey (ABS 2001) and
the less conservative estimate on adding to and updating surveys of international
visitors and domestic consumers undertaken in 1997 (Hoegh-Guldberg 2002: 5).
These figures can be compared with the past estimated scale of the industry (based
mainly on the activities of community-controlled art centres). Pascoe (1981)
estimated an industry of $2.5 million in 1979–80 and Altman (1989) made an
estimate of $18.5 million in 1987–88.
The Indigenous visual art industry is much more complex than  the statistical data
suggest (Altman 1989). Licensing arrangements and collaborative efforts with non-
Indigenous artists, factors such as the array of outlets involved, and distinctions
between ‘fine art’ and ‘souvenirs’, and ‘hand-made’ and ‘manufactured’ art, all
add to the complexity (Hoegh-Guldberg 2002: 5). It is also clear in statistical data
from surveys that individual respondents’ subjective notions about categories and
definitions can influence the results. This is of particular concern in the
international visitor survey data.
Functional levels
There is a high degree of variability in the number of functional levels in different
parts of the industry. Indigenous arts may be retailed in one or more of the
following ways: directly from community art centres, directly from advocacy
groups (an extremely rare practice), and through retail galleries (both specialist and
non-specialist), souvenir shops, gift shops, markets and email sales (Hoegh-
Guldberg 2002: 26–7).
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There are three main components of the commercial sector (Altman 1989). There
are specialist outlets that sell only, or mostly, Indigenous art. There are generalist
outlets (including souvenir and gift shops) selling a small amount of Indigenous art
amongst other product (Altman 1989: 74). The third component of the industry is
focused around the reproduction and licensing of original artworks for value-added
products such as cards and clothing (Rockchild & Wright 1997: 2).
Besides community-based art centres there are other wholesalers of hand-made
product including commercial galleries and private dealers. An Indigenous arts
advocacy organisation, Desart in Alice Springs, operated as a regional wholesaler but
is currently insolvent. A private sector operator in Sydney, Rainbow Serpent, operates
a wholesale warehouse, but mainly for its wholly owned Sydney airport outlets.
There are several different ways in which commercial galleries interact with their
artists. Many just deal in art, either buying it through art centres or wholesalers, or
putting on shows of works owned by other galleries or dealers. Others also deal
directly with a stable of one or more artists, and may effectively operate as their
exclusive agents (with or without contracts). Many of the artists in this situation
are from remote areas that are not serviced by art centres, and it is therefore not
an issue of ‘private dealing’ (discussed below). In some ways, such galleries
emulate the role of a community-based art centre, not only dealing in the artists’
work but also providing or organising ancillary services such as accommodation,
meals, transport and health care. This is a function of the way in which Indigenous
people perceive the production of art—as holistic. Some galleries have their artists
on a retainer, others pay on performance and/or negotiate goods (e.g. cars or
food). Such relationships are not always harmonious, but many are functional. The
artists in such situations can produce huge quantities of work (far more than in an
art centre context) and are heavily promoted by the dealer, who often commands
resources unavailable to a community-controlled art centre.
There are few Indigenously owned commercial galleries and specialist outlets,
although a number are attached to Indigenously owned cultural centres in key
tourist destinations such as Uluru and Kakadu National Parks; and there are
Indigenously owned commercial galleries in Darwin and Alice Springs. These
galleries do not appear to have market advantage because of Indigenous
ownership. At times they appear disadvantaged because of lack of commercial
expertise and the absence of a working capital base.
It would be a mistake to suggest that the industry is only comprised of community-
controlled art centres, commercial galleries and outlets that market Indigenous art
and craft. There are also myriad other players in the industry. These include
Indigenous people who operate as self-represented artists, many of whom have art
school qualifications; Indigenous artists who are directly represented by agents or
commercial galleries; Indigenous artists who are contracted as designers or who
are sole traders or joint venturers in arts manufacturing enterprises; Indigenous
artists who are shareholders in an arts marketing company (e.g. Papunya Tula
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Artists); and itinerant Indigenous people who produce art for sale, often informally
and on an occasional basis. At times, a particular Indigenous artist might also sell
their art in a number of ways, for example, via a community-controlled art centre
as well as to a private dealer or even directly at a market stall. Unfortunately, the
overall significance of individual and informal modes of selling art are extremely
difficult either to monitor or to quantify. Hence the focus here is on formal
institutional arrangements.
The role of community-controlled art centres
The ATSIC-sponsored ACCS research project surveyed 39 community art centres in
remote Australia. Just over half of the art centres surveyed in ACCS are
independently incorporated and the remainder operate under the auspices of
another community organisation such as a community council or outstation
resource agency (Altman et al. 1998; Wright 2000c: 19). As institutions, these art
centres have no analogue in the mainstream arts industry; they have been
structured in such a way as to meet the particular needs of Indigenous artists. The
remote location of most centres in communities that lack opportunities for
education, employment and training, means that they operate in difficult
conditions and play an important sociocultural and economic role.
Membership is made up of community artists. Art centres are Indigenously owned
and controlled, though perceptions about what this actually means varies between
centres. Some see the hiring of Indigenous staff as important, while others attach
more importance to Indigenous control of decisionmaking and governance (Wright
2000b: 67). The role of the art centre manager, whether Indigenous or not, is
crucially important. Some commercial galleries go so far as to state that the quality
of the art work can depend on the quality of the coordinator (Rockchild & Wright
1997: 29).
Art centres are found in a wide variety of social, geographical and cultural settings,
and the roles that they play at local and regional levels and in the broader market
also vary. Art centres deal in a variety of products, from ‘fine art’ to ‘tourist art’.
They undertake a wide variety of tasks. While Mercer (1997: 77) refers to art
centres as ‘production houses’, they are in fact collecting agencies; most also
function as wholesalers and retailers. Others operate as regional art advocacy
agencies and artists’ agents and, at times, in the absence of robust community
infrastructure, might also assist with other roles such as being suppliers of transport
services for ‘return to country’ trips and suppliers of food and other goods. Many
art centres pursue mixed objectives: ‘they are neither entirely cultural nor entirely
commercial enterprises; each is a unique and highly variable amalgam of the
commercial and cultural’ (Wright & Altman 2000: 6). The nature of the services
that art centres provide (e.g. as intercultural mediators) means that they are
creating value for consumer benefit.
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In general terms, ‘the primary obstacles to operating art centres as efficient
businesses are structural, geographical and cultural: the impact of the demands
placed on art centres by producers who, to a greater or lesser extent, own and
control them [are significant]’ (Rockchild & Wright 1997: 23). As Wright notes:
an artist is not serviced by an art centre solely in terms of their productivity, but as a
whole person. An artist also has health, education, nutrition and support needs, which
they often bring to the art centre. There is a strong argument for art centres being key
contributors to the wellness of a community (2002: 9).
The diverse services provided by art centres (often owing to cost shifting by other
agencies), compounded by their remote locations adds to the cost of marketing
arts and this in turn lends support to the ‘market failure’ arguments for
subsidisation by ATSIC under NACISS.
Auction houses
In the mid-1990s leading auction houses began to specialise in Indigenous fine art
auctions, usually on an annual basis and initially in conjunction with sales of ‘tribal’
art. The growth of the secondary Indigenous art market has hastened the
recognition of contemporary Indigenous fine art as investment art (Altman & Taylor
2000). There has been some controversy in recent years concerning auction sales
of Indigenous art. Prices are increasing, often dramatically, but because there are
no droite de suite (resale royalty) statutes in Australia the artists receive no
proportion of these returns. In secondary sales ‘the sale of paintings for tens of
thousands of dollars (or more) for which an artist originally was paid perhaps $100
(or less), are common’ (Altman & Hinkson 1999: 17). The entry of auction houses
into the Indigenous art market has raised some interesting issues in relation to
pricing and consumers. Since auction houses deal in secondary markets, art
centres, as dealers in primary markets, would not expect to present work for sale at
auctions—although at times they do.
In 1999 and 2000, in the run-up to the Olympics, Deutscher-Menzies held annual
specialist Indigenous art auctions. They ceased this practice in 2001. Recently
Sotheby’s, currently the only auction house to hold specialist auctions in
Indigenous art, has emerged as the dominant player in the prestigious auctioning
end of the Indigenous art market. The dominance of Sotheby’s often gets
significant media attention, especially when a new record auction price is attained.
This may partially reflect their high profile. At times, however, this issue is
conflated with the debate about the absence of droite de suite legislation in
Australia and the frustration experienced by living artists who have seen their
works escalate hugely in price in the secondary market in a relatively short period
of time.
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Numbers of artists and geographical regions
Historical information on numbers of Indigenous producers and their geographic
distribution suggests that they number in the region of 5000–6000 (Altman 1989),
although a much higher estimate of 20 000 has been made in the context of
lobbying for a national authenticity label (see below). The recent commercial
galleries survey (ABS 2001) enumerated 5681 Indigenous artists represented by
galleries, although this figure is qualified by the fact that a small number of artists
are represented by more than one gallery (ABS 2001: 7). The figure also reflects
only the ‘fine art’ sector of the industry. In general terms, art and craft production
‘is a market activity that Indigenous Australians appear willing to embrace: the
nature of production, indirect social engagement, (and) expertise all combine to
give them a distinct competitive advantage’ (Wilson 2001: 6).
Since most community-based art centres are in regional and remote Australia, the
majority of artists are also located in these regions. This distribution accords with
market perceptions that more ‘traditional’ Indigenous people live in the more
remote regions and that ‘authentic’ Indigenous art is produced in these places.
There is in fact a growing urban Indigenous arts sector producing both fine and
tourist art. Information on distribution is limited, with little or no disaggregation of
data by (or within) states and territories. Certain regions are known to be more
prolific than others; and several of the more remote regions are known for the
particular style of art produced. For example, the Western Desert region in central
Australia is known for its dot style of painting in acrylic, while cross-hatching styles
using natural ochres and pigments are produced primarily by Arnhem Land artists.
The high mobility of many Indigenous artists adds to the difficulty of ascertaining
precise numbers of participant artists. It is also difficult to quantify precisely the
number of outlets. The 39 art centres in the ACCS survey represented some 4500
member artists (Wright 2000c: 18). The figure of 31 art centres mentioned in the
ABS commercial galleries survey is incorrect (Altman 2001a; Hoegh-Guldberg
2002: 13). At present there appear to be about 70 Indigenous art centres in central
Australia and the Top End of Northern Territory, South Australia and Western
Australia, representing between $10 million and $10.5 million-worth of art-work
sales. Of this revenue, some 60 per cent goes to the artists (Hoegh-Guldberg
2002: 11). Art centres represent a much larger number of artists than do artists’ agents.
On average each art centre in the 1997–98 period serviced 175 producers,
returning each one an estimated $1049 (Altman 2000a: 84). The ACCS survey
emphasises, however, that there is no ‘typical’ art centre. Some may deal with ten
or so artists, while others service over 200; and while most centres operate locally,
some are regional in their scope (Wright & Altman 2000: 18).
There is no estimate of the number of outlets that actually market Indigenous art
and derivatives or imitations (often side-by-side), but it is likely to be in the
hundreds or more Australia-wide. Altman found at least 160 retail outlets and
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mainstream galleries selling Indigenous art (Altman 1989: 69), and more recently
Hoegh-Guldberg (2002: 11) enumerated 270 retail outlets based on a Yellow
Pages search (several of which were also listed as art centres). An unpublished
report (Rockchild & Wright 1997) within the ACCS project surveyed 87 outlets
operating in the commercial sector of the industry. The Indigenous Art Trade
Association (discussed below), which was formed in the late 1990s, has a
membership of about 50 specialist commercial outlets as well as a number of art
centres. There are no firm data on numbers of tourist shops, non-Indigenous
galleries or unlicensed individuals selling Indigenous art and craft.
Product differentiation
Indigenous visual art and crafts are produced in numerous forms. Information from
just one region identifies bark painting, carving and sculpture, pottery, fibre objects
such as woven bags, instruments, tools, regalia such as armbands and necklaces,
painting on paper and prints (Altman 1999a; Hoegh-Guldberg 2002: 26). A
general but imprecise distinction is made in the industry between ‘fine art’ and
‘tourist art’, analogous in some ways to the distinction made between ‘art’ and
‘craft’ in the mainstream industry. ‘Tourist’ art generally encompasses boomerangs,
didgeridoos, small to medium-sized paintings and trinkets, souvenirs, and clothing.
However, from the point of view of the producer, the category can also embrace
larger and more expensive works. For example, in Cairns, local artists are well
aware of the popularity of central desert ‘dot style’ paintings among tourists and
exploit this to their advantage. From the perspective of these artists a relatively
large and expensive art work will still be considered ‘bread and butter art’ for the
tourist market if the dotting technique is used (Anderson 2001: 179).
Manufactured and collaboratively produced products form a proportion of the
market that is difficult to quantify. Products include T-shirts, fabrics and clothing
which can be produced in a variety of ways. ‘Blanks’ of some sort (e.g. fabric,
garments, or didgeridoo tubes) are generally produced by non-Indigenous
manufacturers (and often imported from overseas) and subsequently painted,
carved or printed upon by Indigenous artists and sold as Indigenous products
(Altman 2000b; Hoegh-Guldberg 2002: 25). Such practices raise concerns about
product labelling, consumer education and authenticity which are discussed below.
The degree of vertical integration
There is limited vertical integration in the Indigenous arts industry, although there
is some growth in concentration of industry activity. As a general rule community
art centres are both wholesalers and retailers. They sell wholesale to commercial
galleries and other outlets. Retailing occurs on site, and also via the Internet and
other direct selling to consumers.
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There is an increase in collaboration between artists and print makers. Two
important but very different participants are Northern Editions in Darwin, based at
the Northern Territory University, and the Australian Art Print Network in Sydney.
In the former there is active collaboration between print makers and artists, either
at the artists’ communities or else in Northern Editions’ Darwin studios. Ownership
and sale of prints is negotiated, and print runs are usually split in some proportion
between print makers and art centres, with artists being remunerated when sales
occur. The Print Network in Sydney markets prints, dealing variably with a number
of established print makers or with community art centres.
Some art centres engage in local screen printing: local designers may be employed
as print makers and may also earn income from sales of printed T-shirts or fabric. A
good example of such an enterprise is Tiwi Designs at Nguiu on Bathurst Island. As
a general rule, printed T-shirts are wholesaled to commercial outlets.
There is a high demand for cheap, portable art for the tourist market, but there are
few artists willing to undertake repetitive work for relatively little return. There are
two options open to art centres wanting a slice of this market: they can either
produce their own licensed or value-added product or they can enter into licensing
agreements with manufacturers. There is a strong argument for art centres to
engage in licensing since, if they do not, manufacturers will appropriate or devise
‘Indigenous’ themes and motifs with no financial returns to centres or artists
(Wright 1999: 127). It is also preferable that licensed designs are reproduced on
culturally appropriate products and that the artists themselves fully understand the
way in which their designs will be used (Wright 1999: 128). About one-third of art
centres in the ACCS survey had one or more current licensing agreements.
Desart took an active role in brokering and promoting relationships between
manufacturers of licensed product and art centres between 1998 and 2001. The
result is a range of licensed souvenir products such as T-shirts, postcards, playing
cards, watches and key rings that all carry or are accompanied by information
about the artist and Desart documentation of their authenticity. At the time there
was a strong push for Desart to be developed as a ‘notable’ brand. However, with
the demise of Desart’s commercial activities this may not be pursued.
At Walkatjara Art Centre at Mutitjulu (near Uluru), a market evaluation exercise
led to a reclamation of the souvenir market by local artists. As a result of the
repositioning of the art centre through market research, local artists began to
produce items in new media such as ceramics that they are proud to see in tourist
shops. Designs were selected as ‘market favourites’ and sold under licence to
appear on T-shirts, key rings, prints and magnets. In this way, local artists are
increasing the potential audience for their work, protecting their intellectual
property and ensuring the cultural integrity of souvenirs sold both locally and
nationally (Wright 2000a: 181–85).
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How art is sold and distributed
The path from the artist to the consumer can be direct, or it can be complex and
indirect. At one end of the spectrum is direct dealing between an artist and the
final consumer, as occurs in informal trading in the Todd Street Mall in Alice
Springs. In these dealings there is often considerable producer agency (e.g. desire
for a quick cash sale) and consumer compliance (e.g. desire for a bargain). At the
other end of the spectrum are the government-subsidised art centres that are often
both wholesalers and retailers. It is possible for a work of art to be purchased by an
art centre, then wholesaled to a commercial gallery that may in turn wholesale the
work to an overseas gallery or public art institution.
Art centres were originally established to facilitate the collection and sale of art
from remote localities, especially outstations. Art centre staff are invariably
intercultural mediators between the artists and the market; however the
circumstances of this mediation vary widely. Some artists live at outstations that are
extremely remote and seasonally inaccessible; others live in urban centres such as
Alice Springs, Darwin or Sydney. Consumers visiting art centres include ‘local
people, visitors who have come specifically to the art centre, tourists, wholesalers,
retailers, collectors, [representatives of collecting] institutions, and academics’
(Wright 1999: 99).
Payment and pricing structures
Art centres use a wide variety of payment methods including up-front payment
(the most used method), advance payment, and payment on consignment, as well
as several arrangements involving the Community Development Employment
Projects scheme (CDEP). The price of a work is usually negotiated between artists
and staff though there are many factors involved in deciding what price will appear
on an art work. These include the artist’s reputation, aesthetic judgments, the cost
of production, the financial position of the centre, and the market in which the
item will be sold (Wright 2000c: 32).
Tensions over prices paid are not uncommon and there are several factors
contributing to artists’ (mis)understanding of pricing, such as culturally informed
expectations that differ from market valuations and a poor understanding of
cumulative mark-up processes. Some art centres, for example Warmun Arts in the
east Kimberley, only deal with artists on a consignment (pay-on-sale) basis, which
personalises the exchange and is culturally appropriate in this context. Commercial
galleries are similarly varied in terms of their purchasing structures, with just over
half those surveyed stating that they liked to have the option of purchasing either
on consignment or outright as it allowed for greater flexibility (Rockchild & Wright
1997: 10).
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Just over half of the art centres in the ACCS survey offer discounts. These may be
offered to people making large purchases, to first-time buyers, to local people from
the community, to good customers (particularly as a reward for prompt payment)
and on sales made in the off season (Wright 1999: 102). The offering of discounts
makes the occurrence of collusion unlikely (this point is discussed further below).
The majority of art centres do not have a tiered system for pricing that reflects
retail and wholesale market prices (Wright 2000c: 32).
There is huge variability in the pricing structures implemented by art centres and a
wide range of factors that influences pricing policy. For fine art, the influences
include market forces and demand, prices being charged by competitors, scarcity
or glut of work by a particular artist, quality, whether the artist is elderly, healthy or
deceased, value built into artist’s work from previous marketing, and proximity to
good markets (Altman 1989; Wright 1999).
There is also a high level of variability in perceptions of what is deemed a fair
return to artists. The ACCS survey found that, as a percentage of sale price,
payments to artists ranged from 25 per cent to 80 per cent and mark-ups ranged
from 20 per cent to 200 per cent depending on the centre and the product (Wright
1999: 97). Centres that give a higher return to artists are generally financially
constrained in their ability to conduct marketing and other essential activities
(Wright 2000c: 32). Issues of mark-up are less prevalent with tourist art which is
generally sold outright and marked up by between 100 and 130 per cent
(sometimes inclusive of freight, sometimes not). Mark-up practices in the arts
industry receive considerable media attention from time to time. The situation has
been further complicated by the introduction of the GST, which leads to a
conflation of taxation issues with returns to artists.
A distinction needs to be made between goods that are sold by producers outright
and those that are sold on consignment. The number of stages in a distribution
chain and a lack of vertical integration can result in the final retail price of a work
being several times the return to artist. Artists become aware of this when, for
example, they participate in exhibition openings in southern capital cities.
As a general rule, there is a 40 to 50 per cent sales fee for art provided on
consignment; that is, if a painting sells for $100 the return to the artist (or art
centre) will be $50–$60, paid after the item is sold. However, if an art centre has
been an intermediary and has itself marked up by 50 per cent (which is common
practice) to cover some of its costs, the artist may only receive $40 instead of $60.
Outright sales can be problematic, especially in cases where a commercial gallery
has held onto a work for several years (or has been unable to sell it) and an artist
becomes more popular in the meantime. In such cases, the value of the art held by
the gallery increases markedly. This is similar to the process that occurs when an
auction house sells a work for many times the original payment to the artist. This
is, of course, not unusual in the arts industry generally. However, the value of
Indigenous fine art has increased rapidly in a relatively short time.
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The market
Art centres may apply different levels of mark-up to different art forms; for
example, bark paintings may attract a higher mark-up than baskets because they
require a higher standard of conservation while they are in stock (Maningrida Arts
and Culture (MAC) 2002). In some centres there is also cross-subsidisation
between popular and less popular artists, introducing distortions that financially
penalise the very best artists and benefit the apprentice or mediocre artists
(Morphy 1983: 42). If art centre staff are not legitimately empowered by the
membership (the artists) to implement such variable mark-up policies; if not, they
may be vulnerable to complaints of exploitation or possibly even unconscionable
conduct. Even if such a policy is enshrined in the constitution of the centre, it may
not accord with artists’ perceptions of the fairness of individual transactions. As a
general rule, variable mark-up policies are a response to factors of supply and
demand. Given that works purchased outright will not necessarily be sold, there is
a risk premium for art centres, which needs to be recognised when evaluating
mark-up policies.
Art centres face unique risks in that they tend to have a responsibility to market
the work of all artists in the community, not just those who are better established
(Wilson 2001: 8). Thus the industry is ‘production pushed rather than market
driven’ (Collins Anderson Management 2001: 7). The following comment, made
by an art centre staff member, reflects what may be a general problem for the
marketing and promotion of Indigenous arts:
We have an excess of generic (but good quality) art by young/unknown artists, or old
stock sitting which is desperately hard to move especially given isolation. Supply
outstrips demand, and on the other hand we have incredible demand for a handful of
artists’ top rate work—we can only meet about 20% of the demand for this top level
work. We need more staff to market and to spend time with the artists to increase
quality (Hoegh-Guldberg 2002: 11).
There is a need to acknowledge the enormous significance of financial pressure as
a force driving the production of much Indigenous art, both in the souvenir and
fine art realms. Financial pressures stem from poverty and the demands of extended
family, higher costs of living in remote communities and, at times, alcohol
dependence and substance abuse. For some artists producing art is a means to an
end: generating income to sustain addictions—either their own or those of close
family members. Artists with substance abuse problems may be at greater risk of
unconscionable conduct (see below) on the part of unscrupulous dealers.
Many commercial dealers believe that the commercial sector, especially when
operating in southern capital cities, is best positioned to market and locate buyers
(Rockchild & Wright 1997: 3, 41). Some in the commercial sector have voiced
concern about the general lack of market direction and communication in the
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industry, noting in particular that art centres and commercial galleries needed to
improve their relationship so as to operate more strategically and collaboratively in
the fine arts market. The commercial sector of the industry perceives a need for art
centres to further develop their marketing skills. In particular some art centres are
thought to be passive and lacking a general understanding of the need for
aggressive marketing. However, the marketing abilities of art centres are becoming
more sophisticated over time and the direct marketing efforts and enhanced
professionalism of art centres may lead, in the long run to an increase in their share
of the market, to the detriment of the commercial galleries.
Protecting Indigenous property rights
Indigenous cultural and intellectual property rights refer to Indigenous peoples’
rights to protect their heritage, defined by Janke as ‘the intangible and tangible
aspects of the whole body of cultural practices, resources and knowledge systems
developed, nurtured and refined by Indigenous people’ (1998: xvii). are Two
Commonwealth laws which may help protect Indigenous intellectual property
rights are the Copyright Act 1968 and the Designs Act 1906.
Design and copyright
Design legislation protects both two and three-dimensional designs. Under the
Designs Act individuals may apply to register a design which, if the criteria are met,
then becomes protected from obvious or fraudulent imitations (Janke 1998: 64).
Copyright is a set of particular rights granted to the creator of art (and other)
works based on three main criteria: that the work is original, can be reduced to a
material form and has an identifiable author. There is a range of possible copyright
infringements, from overt illegal unlicensed reproductions to the rather grey area
of ‘Aboriginal-inspired’ designs (Anderson 2002: 8). The appropriation of designs
conceived as generically Indigenous, such as dots or cross-hatching, is a particular
concern in the tourist market, where such designs are commonly reproduced on
manufactured goods such as coffee cups or tea towels (Altman 1989: 288).
In relation to Indigenous art, copyright law has been relatively effective in that
several prosecutions have been made involving a breach of the TPA. In the ‘carpets
case’ of 1996 (discussed in ‘TPA issues of relevance to the Indigenous arts
industry’) the traditional imagery of several Indigenous artists (some of whom are
now deceased) was reproduced on carpets made in Vietnam and imported into
Australia without the artists’ permission. Not only did the court find that copyright
had been infringed, but part of the award was given in consideration of the
damage done due to the culturally inappropriate way in which the reproduction
was made (Janke 1998: 63).
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Historically, since the 1970s, some artists have been represented by the Aboriginal
Artists Agency (Altman 1989). Today, an increasing number of Indigenous artists
are represented by Viscopy, (the Visual Arts Copyright Collecting Agency), a non-
profit organisation established by the federal government in 1995. Viscopy’s role is
to protect artists’ intellectual property and related contractual rights by enforcing
copyright law. It can arrange (on a fee-for-service basis) to seek permission from
artists or their agents to reproduce images (Mellor 2001a: 47). Viscopy currently
represents about 1,000 Australian artists (Viscopy 2002) a number of whom are
Indigenous, including artists from Yirrkala, Balgo and Ramingining (Janke 2001: 82).
There are several mechanisms in place, aside from Viscopy, that are intended to
help police cases of copyright infringement. For example, in the 1990s Vivien
Johnson and her sociology students at Macquarie University created the ‘House of
Aboriginality’ project. The project includes a website that contains a virtual ‘house’
filled with unlicensed, Aboriginally ‘inspired’ product. The site is designed to
support Indigenous artists in attempting to curb the activities of the so-called
‘imitations industry’. Individuals are encouraged to become ‘copyright detectives’
to help expose ‘fakes’ and those who deal in them (Johnson 2002).
The Australian Indigenous Art Trade Association Ltd (AIATA; otherwise referred to
as Art Trade) is a national voluntary association for individuals and organisations
experienced in the business of Indigenous art. It promotes the ethical trade of
Indigenous art and attempts to foster consumer confidence in those dealing in
Indigenous art (AIATA 2000). In 2000, Art Trade arrived at a determination about
the use of exclusive contracts. It does not encourage the use of such contracts
because it sees them as a restraint on trade. Moreover, they do not take into
account the artists’ day-to-day circumstances, and they are prejudicial because
language and cultural barriers disadvantage the artists. However, Art Trade will
honour contracts if they are for a maximum of two years. After that they are
renegotiated if a local language speaker and/or artist’s advocate is present during
negotiations, and if there is no legal duress brought to bear on the artist if they
breach the contract.
Authenticity labels
Authenticity labelling and statements of provenance are specific to the Indigenous
arts industry and their existence illustrates one of the fundamental differences
between buying art or craft produced by mainstream artists and purchasing an
item produced by an Indigenous artist. The issue is one of cross-cultural
communication. Consumers can approach a non-Indigenous artist (or their heirs)
directly if they have any concerns about provenance and their conversation or
correspondence will (almost invariably) be in English. Indigenous artists from ‘the
bush’ rarely have access to mainstream media such as newspapers and magazines
that may draw their attention to provenance issues, many are illiterate and would
have difficulty understanding comments made in English about their art practice
and subject matter.
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Many consumers are now aware of the need for some form of documentation to
verify provenance. Consumers frequently express the view to art centres and
galleries that they want to buy genuine product made by Indigenous artists, and
want to know that the artist was paid fairly for their work.
After tentative industry support the National Indigenous Arts Advocacy Association
(NIAAA) launched the national authenticity label in November 1999. The label is a
certified trade mark intended to deter the sales of ‘rip off’ products and to inform
consumers of the ethnicity of producers. The introduction of the label is intended
to benefit Indigenous artists and their communities, the broader art community
and the tourism industry. Artists and businesses apply to the Label of Authenticity
Registry for permission to use the tags and stickers on their products. Once
applicants have been approved (the definition of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander person is in line with the Commonwealth Government’s three-pronged
definition—ancestry, self-definition and community acceptance) they pay an
annual fee to register (NIAAA 2001). To date a limited number of artists are
participating in the scheme and art centres and regional organisations operate
competing authenticity labels.
Few community-based art centres (or their member artists) have registered for
NIAAA’s label. The reasons include the cost and administrative complexity, the
existence of alternative documentation produced by the art centres themselves,
and a degree of antipathy on the part of many artists, especially those from remote
regions, to the requirement to provide proof of Aboriginality.
Regional authenticity certification, such as the Gooren Mulla label in Cairns has
also been developed. Desart launched the Central Australian Indigenous Art
certification, which represents a shift in the industry away from the notion of
policing the market and a move towards an emphasis on the education of
consumers and the promotion of best practice (Congreve 2000). With regard to
certification, the objectives of Desart and NIAAA are different. While the NIAAA
label focuses on the identity of the producer, Desart aims to ensure that ‘the
provenance of a work, the materials used and the returns to artists are correctly
documented, and that the use of standard and equitable contracts between artists
and retailers is encouraged’ (Congreve 2000: 87). The national label is intended to
be used alongside, rather than in competition with, regional or art centre labels.
There has, however, been little, if any market research on the question of how
consumers will react to being faced with products bearing two or three different
swing tags (Altman 1999b: 6). In Cairns, the majority of artists and business
owners believed that regional labelling is more proactive, more effective and easier
to monitor than a national label (Anderson 2002: 4).
It is NIAAA’s hope that ‘as a marketing tool, the Label of Authenticity will greatly
increase the participation of Indigenous artists within the Indigenous arts and
cultural economy and increase the financial benefits to both artists and
communities’ (NIAAA 2001). However, the evident lack of support from most rural
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and remote artists for the label raises the question of its viability. The argument has
been made that financial resources expended on the label might be better spent
on establishing and underwriting additional art centres and further developing
regional authentication systems (Wilson 2001: 15).
The ACCS survey identified that, for commercial operators, a major advantage in
dealing with art centres was certainty about the authenticity or integrity of the
product (Rockchild & Wright 1997: 16). Many art centres dealing in fine art have
created their own mechanisms for documenting provenance. When art works are
sold, documentation is provided to the consumer, with an archival copy being kept
by the art centre for future reference. Documentation may include the artist’s
language group, the cultural ‘story’ of the artwork, a catalogue number, the media
used, a copyright statement and a photograph of the art work. Such
documentation confirms and promotes authenticity, as well as providing a means
of maintaining cultural records. Warlukurlangu Artists in Yuendumu and
Maningrida Arts and Culture provide best practice examples (see Wright 2000a:
101–10).
While NIAAA states that ‘the Label of Authenticity should not be confused with
defining what is ‘modern’, ‘traditional’ or ‘real’ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
culture’ (NIAAA 2001), this has been a real concern for artists and perhaps one
reason why so few have registered. The NIAAA label has been criticised because it
provides no safeguard against the appropriation of region-specific art styles, a
question of particular concern to artists from central and northern Australia (Wilson
2001: 8). The concern is that the label conflates the issue of Indigenous authorship
with that of authenticity (Altman 2000b: 92). The Indigenous arts industry ‘need(s)
to … recognise that the Pan-Aboriginal identity does not extend to a homogenised
Indigenous culture’ (Wilson 2001: 8). The national label cannot, as it is presently
constituted, limit copyright infringement or, in itself, directly stop imitations. All the
label can do is provide consumers with information about the ethnicity of the artist
(Altman 1999b: 3).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that commercial gallery operators may remove
NIAAA’s label from art works before exhibiting them. Galleries do not want to
display a range of items carrying several pieces of documentation. Nor do they
wish to have a mixture of labelled and unlabelled items on display, because it
might be confusing to the consumer and might imply that unlabelled products
were not authentic. One of the strongest concerns emerging from discussions
about the label is the question of whether artists who choose not to register are
placed at a disadvantage in the market and potentially treated as suspect by
consumers. At the time of the 2000 Olympics, the Customs Department issued
information to people entering Australia stating that unless an artwork had the
NIAAA label on it, the product was not genuine. At the time, the NIAAA labels had
not yet been printed. A new leaflet was subsequently published stating that
NIAAA’s label was only one of a number of ways of determining authenticity.
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The distinction between fine art and mass-produced items is again important in
relation to labels of authenticity. Generally speaking, those operating in the fine art
arena have been reluctant to register for the national label, believing that their
own signature, label or document of authenticity should be enough to verify the
authenticity of their work in the national or international arts arena. It is at the
cheaper end of the art market that NIAAA’s label could be most effective, assuring
consumers that items they purchase have been properly licensed (this applies
particularly to manufactured product like T-shirts, see Altman 1999b). However,
this too is a potentially problematic area because a number of artists directly sign
agreements with manufacturers and at times themselves produce highly derivative
designs. NIAAA states that ‘tourists do not want to fly all the way to Australia … to
purchase art or cultural product that looks of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
origin but is not’ (NIAAA 2001). However,  most ‘rip-offs’ occur in the cheap
tourist art sector, which is particularly price-sensitive (Altman 1999b: 3). It is
debatable whether tourists would be willing to pay more for ‘authentic’ tourist art
and feedback from retailers strongly indicates that price is often more important
than provenance to souvenir hunters.
Approaches to consumer and producer education
National and regional advocacy bodies attempt to ensure the cultural integrity of
Indigenous art through consumer education strategies. Many art centres produce
promotional material such as brochures to inform potential consumers about the
role of the centre, profiles of artist members, and the cultural background and types
and styles of art they produce. NIAAA, the Association of Northern Kimberley and
Arnhem Aboriginal Artists (ANKAAA) and Desart all use the Internet to promote
their organisations and artists. Maintaining the integrity of product and style is best
achieved closest to the source of the works and individual art centres are active in
this realm (Wilson 2001: 7). The Cairns-based Gooren Mulla authenticity label is
an attempt on the part of artists and businesses to both educate the public and
pressure local outlets not to sell ‘fake’ art (Anderson 2002: 14).
Maningrida Arts and Culture (MAC) has been encouraged by the success of their
website in educating consumers. In 1998 the website was averaging between
7000 and 10 000 hits a week from around the world (Wright 2000a: 223). People
interested in purchasing art can access the site to gain a more in-depth
understanding of styles of work available, and when requests are made MAC is
able to sell works after sending digital images to consumers (Maningrida Arts and
Culture 2002: 11–12). Recently, MAC was successful in securing a grant under the
Commonwealth Government’s OzeCulture: Making IT Work Program to further
develop the web as a core element of MAC’s marketing operations.
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The nature of competition within the
industry
There seems to be a healthy level of competition at all functional levels of the
industry, notwithstanding that a few art centres have exclusive access to some
geographically defined art styles. There may be an element of ‘monopsony’
(supply monopoly) in the relationship between a sole agent and a particular artist
or set of artists, but the generic art style will have many competitors. Similarly,
some outlets have monopolistic commercial concessions.
Some community councils have a (formal or informal) policy of discouraging or
preventing other individuals or organisations based in the community from trading
in Indigenous art, unless they are also Indigenously owned and controlled
community organisations (Wright 1999: 123). In Yuendumu, there were two art
centres but their products were aimed at very different markets so as to avoid
direct competition (Wright 1999: 124). This issue is addressed in ‘Barriers to entry
and other competition issues’.
While artists are, in theory, free to sell to whomever they choose, most trading in
remote areas is done through art centres (Altman 1990: 7; Wright 1999: 123). Art
centre operations may therefore appear to be fertile ground for exclusive dealing.
However, there are provisions in the legislation for authorisation of certain conduct
in cases where it is of public benefit (discussed later). Regional advocacy
organisations such as ANKAAA can apply for collective authorisation.
Wright found that 46 per cent of the art centres surveyed in the ACCS project had
to contend with private dealers accessing the artists in their region. A ‘private
dealer’ is understood here as a person who regularly approaches artists with an
offer to buy product directly from them. Private dealers rarely, if ever, purchase any
work through the art centre. They may be a visitor, or resident in the community;
they may be operating a shopfront gallery or may wholesale to other galleries.
A recent issue of Australian Indigenous Art News (the Art Trade journal) carried a
letter to the editor from Craig Herbert, manager of Marrawuddi Gallery in Jabiru
(Northern Territory). He raises concerns about ‘poachers’ at both Marrawuddi and
Injalak Arts (50 kilometers away):
these two art centres … are suffering … the problem we both face is that some
independent art dealers are using highly unethical behaviour to obtain paintings from
artists … also it is art centres that foster the young upcoming artists that many of you
have little interest in, until such time as they start to get a ‘name’. It is then that these
… operators move in to claim the benefits and dismiss art centres … (Herbert 2001: 2).
The higher the value of the art produced, the more likely it is that art centres will
have to compete with private dealers. Whereas art centres are responsible to
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members, their constitutions and the broader community, private dealers are only
responsible to themselves. Private dealers  acquiring art from a certain region may
be supplying the same market as the region’s art centres and thus operating in
direct competition to them. For art centres, this may result in difficulties at a
number of levels and it may ultimately undermine their commercial viability. Private
dealers can take advantage of the promotional activities of art centres (as free-
riders); and may purchase works made with materials paid for by art centres
(Wright 1999: 125). At times, however, art centres may benefit from the provision
of material to ‘their’ artists by private dealers.
There may be several reasons why artists deal with private dealers including the
form of payment, pressure from family for money, substance addiction or a desire
to hedge bets. Desire for a quick cash sale is one key reason why artists may sell to
private dealers rather than to an art centre, and this can result in the market being
flooded by hastily produced, sub-standard work that is then overpriced. About half
of the commercial galleries surveyed in the ACCS survey had dealt with private
dealers (Rockchild & Wright 1997: 37). Advantages cited (contradicting the
statement above) included quality, range of selection and price as well as general
convenience (the remoteness of art centres is a barrier for some).
It is vital for art centres to maintain good relations with commercial galleries.
Because of their isolated locations, few centres can survive solely on direct retail
sales to the public: ‘good relationships with commercial outlets provide financial
stability to the centres, the potential for growth, and valuable market feedback’
(Wright 1999: 120). Some people operating commercial galleries take advantage
of the remote location of art centres, to the financial detriment of the centres.
Areas of particular concern include slow payment or non-payment of debts,
unreasonably high mark-ups on art centre stock, the giving of false or misleading
information about product origin or authorship (later discussed in more detail), and
delays or refusals to provide information about sales or stock held (Wright 1999:
120–21).
Some commercial galleries actively avoid dealing with art centres that have artists
who work for other galleries in the same city. There is a belief that: ‘there is not
enough room for the multiple dealing of one artist, so not wanting to cause
problems for other galleries, some dealers claimed to stay clear of each other’s
turf’ (Rockchild & Wright 1997: 42). this is particularly the case with more popular
artists. Rockchild and Wright also found that some commercial outlets believed
that art centres that operate to make a profit cause problems because they are
competing directly with commercial outlets.
Art centres are increasingly recognising that they operate in a competitive
commercial environment (Altman 2000b: 91). There is no evidence that art centres
collude in price fixing; the market appears very effective. There are some cases of
exclusive dealing with particular commercial galleries, but such decisions are
usually based on commercial or moral grounds—for example, experience with
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other galleries of slow payment or non-payment or excessive mark-ups or
culturally inappropriate display.
Competition from imports and non-Indigenous sources
Cheap imitations are often available in the tourist market, although the significance
of their impact on sales of genuine items is difficult to assess. In some cases the
product may never enter Australia, for example when items are manufactured in
Asia and then exported to Europe where they may be sold as genuine Indigenous
Australian product (Hoegh-Guldberg 2002: 23). At times, Indigenous community
art centres like Tobwabba in northern NSW arrange offshore manufacture on a
licensed basis to take advantage of cheaper labour costs. The status of the
resulting products is ambiguous: they are licensed by an Indigenous organisation,
and so are no more classifiable as ‘imitations’ than any other licensed product, but
they are manufactured in similar manner to outright imitations.  The extent to
which imitations are being passed off as Indigenous product is unclear (personal
communication, Susan Congreve, ANKAAA), although Hoegh-Guldberg speculates
this to be a ‘very significant trade’ (Hoegh-Guldberg 2002: 23). In 1994, imported
plastic replicas of wooden coolamons made by Mutitjulu people were being sold
alongside the authentic product, but at a cheaper price. While the imported goods
had stickers on them stating the country of origin, these were easily removed or
lost (Janke 1998: 38). The ‘carpets case’ previously referred to involved carpets
with unlicensed Indigenous designs imported from Vietnam (Janke 1998: 39).
There have been numerous complaints from Darwin about bamboo didgeridoos
made in Indonesia, the identity of the importers remains a mystery. The
instruments have no labels stating that they are made by Aboriginal people, but
they are painted in derivative Arnhem Land and Central Desert designs (personal
communication, Susan Congreve, ANKAAA). This may be a case of
misrepresentation by silence; consumers may assume that the ‘fakes’ are authentic
given their design and the lack of labelling stating otherwise.
TPA issues of relevance to the Indigenous
arts industry
The primary task of this project is to identify potential TPA issues in the Indigenous
arts industry. In this section we introduce the relevant sections of the TPA and pose
some questions that attempt to illuminate some trade practices issues. The most
relevant parts of the TPA for the Indigenous arts industry are Part IV (anti-
competitive practices), Part IVA (unconscionable conduct) and Part V (fair trading
and consumer protection). Note that TPA authorisation of otherwise prohibited
conduct (Part VII) can be sought for many breaches of Part IV of the TPA—except
those involving a misuse of market power (Part IV, s. 46). Since conduct may be
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authorised if it otherwise enhances the welfare of the community, it is entirely
possible that many potential transgressions might be allowed in an industry that is
firmly embedded in Indigenous culture and hence Indigenous welfare. However,
the process of authorisation can be complex, and the cost of $7500 may dissuade
individuals or groups from applying.
Several breaches of the TPA (including exclusive dealing, misleading or deceptive
conduct, and false representations) are confined to circumstances where the
conduct complained of has been engaged in ‘in trade or commerce’ (see Miller
2001: 66). An employee works under the direction of an employer (who may be
engaged ‘in trade or commerce’) and may be distanced from the conduct in
question. Thus one issue concerns the number of artists who could be considered
sole traders (i.e. independent operators or contractors) rather than employees.
The academic debate on the status of CDEP scheme workers may shed some light
on the status of Indigenous artists. The operational definition of an employee (as
opposed to an independent contractor) for tax purposes turns on who controls
either the tools used or general working arrangements. This distinction is important
in the Indigenous context because the employment status of CDEP scheme
participants is ambiguous in many respects.2  Many artists in the CDEP scheme
have no superannuation coverage, they control the tools used in their work and
they receive little direction from management.3  However, the main debate over
the status of CDEP scheme workers focuses on whether they are welfare recipients
or employees, not whether they are sole traders or employees (Morphy & Sanders
2001).
Another issue to be considered in determining the nature of the relationship
between CDEP scheme and artists, is whether a worker is producing for the tourist
market or creating fine art. Arts and craft in the tourist market is more likely to be
produced in a manufacturing paradigm with limited opportunities for creative input
from workers. Artists producing fine art may work in the CDEP scheme but their
unique skills may mean that they have some ‘market power’ in the relationship
with their employers and therefore may have some special arrangements, informal
or otherwise, whereby they have some control over their artistic output. In these
circumstances, it is arguable whether these artists are employees. It should also be
noted that the growing numbers of individual Australian workplace agreements
means that the nature of the employee-employer relationship is changing, with the
distinction between employees and contractors becoming increasingly blurred.
2 For example, the ABS treats CDEP scheme workers as employed for statistical purposes,
but other important aspects of an employee/employer relationship are often missing.
3 Ironically, the Tax Act currently treats CDEP scheme workers as welfare recipients as
they are eligible for the beneficiary rebate.
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If one was forced to classify CDEP scheme workers, the majority would be
considered employees because they are covered by worker’s compensation and
are subject to potential direction to do specific jobs by management. However
even in such circumstances, the TPA may be relevant since it applies to
organisations (including CDEP organisations) that trade in art work. Consequently,
conduct by employees may bind the organisation if it is done within the
employee’s actual or apparent scope of authority (s. 84). More generally, a person
may be considered to be a secondary offender if they are involved in some way in
a contravention of the TPA (e.g. by aiding and abetting, inducing others to
contravene, being in any way knowingly concerned, conspiring with others) (s.
75B). For example, if an artist and an organisation were to arrange to create and
then sell a forgery of another prominent artist’s work, then the TPA may cover the
misrepresentations that arise. Obviously, there is a considerable grey area in the
relationship between CDEP organisations and artists on CDEP, and the TPA may
apply to some artists employed in the scheme.
The TPA may also be relevant for Indigenous artists not associated with the CDEP
scheme. Indeed, if the CDEP artists only supply a small part of the market, the TPA
may affect many of the remaining Indigenous artists. The following discussion
focuses on the TPA issues for such artists, the rest of the Indigenous arts industry
and consumers.
Anti-competitive practices
Part IV of the TPA prohibits practices such as anti-competitive agreements, misuse
of market power, exclusive dealing and mergers. Anti-competitive agreements
include those that result in, or are intended to result in, a substantial lessening of
competition within the market. Note that price fixing agreements are prohibited
outright.
Exclusive dealing is an arrangement under which a retailer or wholesaler contracts
to purchase from a supplier on the understanding that no other distributor will be
appointed or receive supplies in a given area. One form of exclusive dealing
prohibited per se is ‘third line forcing’. It involves the supply of goods or services
on condition that the purchaser acquire goods or services from a particular third
party or a refusal to supply because the purchaser will not agree to that condition
(s. 47(6)). Otherwise, exclusive dealing is only prohibited if it has the purpose or
effect of substantially lessening competition (Part IV, s. 47).
Sellers sometimes engage in price fixing and market sharing to earn ‘supra-normal’
profits. The TPA is therefore ‘suspicious’ of resale price maintenance, tie-in
contracts, territorial restraints in joint ventures and mergers, horizontal price
agreements not linked with market power, and any vertical restraints (i.e.
restrictions or conditions imposed on the seller or buyer of an item). The following
discussion gives some examples of such practices to illustrate the main TPA issues
that may arise in the context of the Indigenous arts industry.
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Resale price maintenance occurs when suppliers, manufacturers and wholesalers
are prohibited from specifying a minimum price below which goods or services
may not be resold or advertised for resale. Resale price maintenance is also known
as ‘vertical price fixing’. It is targeted by the TPA because it is thought to diminish
intra-brand competition (Part IV, ss. 48, 96–100). Examples of resale price
maintenance include: inducing resellers not to discount (e.g. by giving special deals
to resellers who agree not to discount) and threatening resellers by refusing to
continue to supply them.
A supplier may recommend a resale price provided that the document setting out
the suggested price makes it clear that it is a recommended price only. Suppliers
may specify a maximum price without infringing the resale price maintenance
prohibition. Note that, in our assessment, putting an art work on consignment
means that it is reasonable to place a reservation price on it. However, if a work is
sold outright, then the resale price maintenance provisions would come into force.
Exclusive dealing can reduce intra-brand competition, but can enhance inter-brand
competition by preventing free-riders who have not made any investments in the
image and reputation of products (as in the case previously discussed, of some
private dealers who take advantage of the promotional activities of art centres). To
have a meaningful discussion on the effect of exclusive dealing it is necessary to
have an operational definition of what constitutes a ‘brand’ (e.g. individual artists,
art centres or ‘regional styles’). In the fine art market, Indigenous artists are
associated with a ‘regional style’. A definition of ‘brand’ based on regions
presupposes an adequate definition of a ‘region’, and this is not easily achieved.
For example, Arnhem Land is often disaggregated into subregions such as
Western, Central, and Eastern Arnhem Land (Ryan 1990; Sever 2001).
Arguably, the abstract concept of ‘brand’ may be defined in relation to the
excellence of the individual artist. However, the situation is complicated by the fact
that many artists do not individually own the designs they use. The ownership of a
design may be vested in a clan or other social grouping
Even if it is possible to arrive at a functional definition of ‘brand’ for Indigenous
fine art, it is important to recognise that the concept has less relevance in the
tourist art market where there are few meaningful distinctions between artistic
styles. Exclusive dealing and other vertical constraints are unlikely to affect the
level of competition in the tourist market where the vast majority of firms are small
relative to the overall size of the industry.
Some art centres make a point of recommending that artists get their supplies from
particular establishments. Given that there is, to our knowledge, no instance of a
refusal to supply retail or wholesale services when artists do not purchase their
supplies from such sources, this cannot be considered as third line forcing. Such
recommendations should be characterised as art centres informing artists about
market conditions.
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Barriers to entry and other competition issues
What can be classified as a barrier to entry is highly contestable. Bain (1956)
defines a barrier to entry as anything that allows incumbent firms to earn excessive
(or ‘supra-normal’) profits without threat of entry. Stigler (1968) offers an
alternative definition based on cost asymmetries between incumbents and
entrants. A barrier to entry is a cost of producing that must be borne by a firm
which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by a firm already in the industry
(and implies a distortion in the allocation of resources from the social point of
view).
Factors that prevent competitors from entering a particular industry may be
innocent, for example an absolute cost advantage on the part of the firm that
dominates the market, or deliberate, such as high spending on advertising to make
it very expensive for new firms to enter the market and establish themselves.
Other entry barriers may result from a firm’s technological advantage, often
protected by patents, or from a firm’s existing access to end users as a result of its
control of the distribution network. Barriers to entry reduce the external threat of
competition in a market, thereby enabling incumbents to charge higher-than-
competitive prices. The concept of barriers to entry is complex and may involve a
number of dimensions: existing firms may manufacture a product more cheaply
because of economies of scale, may have built up a strong brand loyalty, control
the supply of raw material, or own the patent rights to all or part of the production
process (Bannock et al. 1998).
Miller (2001: 270) describes barriers to entry as the ultimate determinate of the
existence or absence of market power. The case, ACCC v Boral Ltd (1999), is used
to clarify what is meant by the term in the context of the TPA: barriers to entry
exclude economic circumstances which make it unattractive, irrational or
impossible for a new entrant to enter the market. The same case is used by Miller
to list several matters to be considered in determining whether a barrier to entry
existed in the relevant market.4
The TPA takes into account the ‘height’ of barrier to entry when evaluating
whether a substantial lessening of competition has occurred (Part IV, ss. 50 and
50A). The process of assessing whether a substantial lessening of competition has
occurred is described in detail in Miller (2001: 212–3).
Given the complexity and an element of imprecision, in the standard definition of
barrier to entry, it is necessary to focus our discussion on specific issues in the
4 The appeal of the Boral case to the full Federal Court further ‘clarified’ the issue  by
indicating that dynamic market behaviour by incumbent firms to exclude rivals by a
variety of uncompetitive practices was as much a barrier to entry as any structural
condition in the market.
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Indigenous arts industry. Under Bain’s definition the authenticity label may provide
a barrier to new entrants if it is costly to join the label and consumers have a
strong loyalty to the label (‘brand’). Clearly however, given their approval for
NIAAA’s registration of the trademark, the ACCC found that there was no problem
of this kind.5  The role of economies of scale will be introduced briefly in the
section that provides an overview of the Indigenous arts industry. Control over the
supply of raw materials will be explored in the context of the discussion of the
potential for ‘exclusive dealing’.
Unconscionable conduct
Part IVA of the TPA deals with unconscionable conduct both in commercial
dealings (ss. 51AA and 51AC) and consumer transactions (ss. 51AA and 51AB).
The term unconscionable conduct has come to refer in common law to
circumstances that have the following elements (Bruce 1999):
! an unequal relationship—in the sense that one of the parties is under a special
disability, for example by virtue of age, infirmity, illiteracy or lack of education
! the stronger party is aware of the disability and then exploits it to their
advantage.
The TPA provides a non-exhaustive list of specific considerations and situations
which, arguably, may help to define unconscionable conduct without the need to
demonstrate a ‘special’ disability (ss. 51AB and  51AC). This ‘statutory
unconscionability’ goes beyond s. 51AA and appears to cover conduct that would
not otherwise be found to be unconscionable within the meaning of the common law.
Obviously, there is a potential for such issues to arise in the context of both
consumer transactions as well as between artists and commercial galleries or
community-based art centres. The role of asymmetries of bargaining power and
information sets (e.g. about the value of the art) are discussed at length below, and
illustrated in several anecdotes provided in interviews of current industry participants.
5 While NIAAA’s arrangements originally held some anti-competitive and consumer effect
concerns for the ACCC (such that it considered that s. 45 and/or s. 52 of the Act may
apply), the areas of concern were allayed through amendments to the rules governing
use of the mark, and through further clarification of the manner in which the
arrangements are to be administered (ACCC media release: MR 213/99, 4 November
1999, ‘No objection to Indigenous certification trade mark’).
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Misleading and deceptive conduct
Part V of the TPA deals with fair trading and contains provisions aimed at protecting
consumers and ethical traders. Of particular relevance here are s. 52 (misleading or
deceptive conduct), s. 53 (false or misleading representations), and ss. 55 and 55A
(misleading the public as to the nature or characteristics of goods and services).
Section 52 of the TPA contains a general prohibition that ‘a corporation shall not,
in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely
to mislead or deceive’.
Section 53 of the TPA specifically prohibits false claims about:
! the standard, quality, value, grade, composition, style, model or history of
goods and services
! the price of goods and services (e.g. that it is less than a competitor’s price)
! the place of origin of the goods.
Other specific prohibitions potentially relevant to the Indigenous arts industry,
include:
! misleading the public as to the nature or characteristics of goods and services
! bait advertising (of goods which cannot be supplied in reasonable quantities at
that price for a reasonable period)
! accepting payment without intending to supply.
The NIAAA authenticity label may involve certain TPA issues surrounding the term
‘misleading and deceptive conduct’. There is potential for an authentically licensed
product to misrepresent the extent to which it is the work of an Indigenous artist if,
for example, the artwork was authenticated despite only being partly produced by
Indigenous artists or if it was created by Indigenous artists without customary
authority to produce the particular style (Fair Trading/Unfair Practices covered in
TPA, Part V, ss. 51–65A, see ACCC 2001b).6  Note that some TPA issues may
overlap with offences under the Fraud and the Crimes Acts, and various state/
territory fair trading acts.
While the authenticity label could be characterised as a direct attempt to curtail
misleading and deceptive conduct on the part of non-Indigenous artists who pose
as Indigenous artists, it may also involve other TPA issues (e.g. it may be a barrier
to entry if it is expensive or difficult for new Indigenous artists to get
authenticated—see the discussion of NIAAA in the previous section).
6 Note that the NIAAA documentation does not specify whether an art work was created
by Indigenous artists with customary authority to produce the particular style.
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Harassment and coercion
Section 60 of the TPA prohibits the use of physical force, undue harassment by a
corporation in relation to the supply of goods or services to a consumer, or in
relation to payment by a consumer for goods and services. While this section is of
potentially wide application, it has received little judicial scrutiny (Miller 2001:
467). When the TPA was introduced the section was limited to the use of force
etc. at a place of residence, but this limitation was removed in 1986. Unlike the
common law tort of intimidation, there is no requirement that harassment or
coercion involve a threat of an illegal act, only that the conduct is undue.
Miller (2001) claims that the term ‘undue’ is likely to be given its ordinary
dictionary definition of ‘unwarranted; excessive; too great’. In the context of the
Indigenous arts industry where intercultural transactions are the norm, the term
‘undue’ may be particularly difficult to define. This ambiguity, in combination with
a possibly unequal relationship between the parties involved, may mean that some
‘harassment and coercion’ may resemble the unconscionable conduct described
above. Also, given that s. 60 of the TPA focuses on consumers, artists may not be
classified under this section unless they are interpreted by the courts to be
consumers. An artist, in effect a producer, may be considered to be a consumer if
the transaction with a supplier does not exceed $40 000.7
How the TPA might articulate with the
Indigenous arts industry
In this section, we revisit those parts of the TPA outlined above and discuss, in
more detail, how they may be relevant to the Indigenous arts industry.
Anti-competitive agreements
The possibility of collusion and cartel appears limited in the primary art and craft
market. Historically, a number of art centres cooperated in 1987 to boycott a
government-funded company, Aboriginal Arts Australia, an action that led to the
formation of the peak body ANCAAA (then the Association of Northern and
Central Australian Aboriginal Artists, see Altman 1989). This move was
7 Note that s.4B of the TPA defines a consumer as someone (including a corporation)
who purchases goods (that are both not for resale or use in a production process)
where the price of the goods did not exceed $40 000; or,  where that price exceeded
the prescribed amount, the goods were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal,
domestic or household use or consumption or the goods consisted of a commercial road
vehicle.
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unchallenged by the Trade Practices Commission but if it were to occur today it
might be challenged by the ACCC. It is, however, unlikely that such action would
be possible today, particularly given the lack of unity among representative bodies
within the industry and the absence of a government-sponsored company.
There have been anecdotal suggestions of collaboration between commercial
galleries and staff of public institutions to promote individual Indigenous artists’
careers and increase the value of art works owned or traded by dealers. The
mainstream arts industry benchmarks for establishing that an artist has achieved
significant career success is to be featured in non-selling exhibitions and included
in the collections of public institutions. Some commercial galleries appear to have
cultivated relationships with institutional staff in order to secure major exhibitions
for artists they represent. Some of the paintings included in retrospective
exhibitions are owned by dealers, and additional value is created through their
being presented in a major exhibition.
There are situations in which competition may favour some parties to the
detriment of others, or where an apparent short-term advantage to a party may
contribute to their long-term disadvantage. A case in point is where the activities
of private dealers compromise the viability of a community art centre, to the
ultimate disadvantage, of the artists who depend on the centre.
An ATSIC subsidised community-controlled art centre, Injalak Arts located at
Oenpelli community, western Arnhem Land faces competition from a number of
other agents operating in the same community. These competing agents are either
non-Indigenous entrepreneurs or else have formed informal business associations
with local Aboriginal people. As an incorporated community organisation Injalak is
fully accountable for its activities and financial performance, whereas the activities
of these other agents are far less transparent. While artists’ agency is clearly a
factor such competing arrangements, the viability of Injalak Arts is potentially
jeopardised by such activities and there is also a risk of unconscionability in
relations between artists and such private dealers.
Exclusive dealing
This section of the TPA may be relevant to the industry in situations where the
distribution of a collective body of regional artwork is restricted in some way by
the actions of an art centre, commercial outlet or private dealer. There are almost
no exclusive relationships between art centres and artists. However, there may be
exclusive dealing scenarios with private dealers where artists are trapped into
producing art for a certain individual (often away from their communities), though
this is more likely a matter of unconscionable conduct (see ‘Unconscionable
conduct and the nature of Indigenous “disability”’).
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One of the few known cases in which an artist has entered into exclusive
contracts with dealers concerns the Ngukurr artist Ginger Riley who made
complaints to Darwin police in relation to art works being sold in his name.
The claim relates to 40–50 paintings created in a workshop organised by
Fred Torres. Mr Torres was aware that the artist was under an exclusive
contract with Beverly Knight of Alcaston House Gallery. Knight alleged that
the paintings were fakes and that Riley had been coerced into producing the
works (McDonald 2000: 35).
Resale price maintenance
As indicated, suppliers may specify a maximum price without infringing the resale
price maintenance prohibitions. However, the issue in the Indigenous arts industry
is rarely about preventing retailers from going below a certain price, and more
often about encouraging them to desist from over-inflating the price. Most artists
and art centres (and presumably galleries that wholesale and retail), who sell their
paintings to dealers recognise that they cannot place restrictions on the retail price
of the artworks. On balance, there is no evidence that resale price maintenance is
a problem in the sector.
Barriers to entry
Barriers to entry for commercial galleries and agents can result from restrictions on
access to Aboriginal land, although in practice this is a law that can be breached. It
is difficult to monitor and is in any case outside the jurisdiction of the ACCC.
Community councils can put mechanisms in place which prevent or discourage
unauthorised individuals or organisations from trading in art. Such policies, if
effectively policed, could potentially be characterised as barriers to entry. However,
fewer than half of the centres surveyed in the ACCS were able to operate as
monopolies in the local community.
In dealing with ‘poachers’, artists are exercising their freedom to choose with
whom they deal. An artist might desire a quick cash transaction, but may also be
aware that they may receive lower returns than they would do when dealing with
the government-funded community art centre. The activities of private dealers can
considerably undermine art centres. ‘Poachers’ target big-name artists, including
artists that art centres rely on to subsidise the support of emerging artists. The very
existence of ‘poachers’ and independent dealers provides prima facie evidence that
barriers to entry are not problematic in the overall industry.
A related point is that most of the wholesale and retail outlets are reasonably small
relative to the overall size of the industry. While it is possible that there are
unexploited economies of scale, especially among art centres, the political,
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geographic, and cultural constraints of rationalising operations across several
communities means that any such economies are unlikely to be realised in the near
future. In any case, the cost savings of larger operations might be offset by the
difficulties involved in managing artists from a range of communities, cultures and
language groups.
A potential barrier to entry is associated with the label of authenticity although it is
far from clear if this has proven an effective barrier. The low take-up rates of
NIAAA’s label means that it is extremely unlikely that non-participants will be
disadvantaged by the label. The only possible exception was the debacle at the
time of the Sydney Olympics (previously referred to, that probably lost sales across
the whole industry. The failure of the label to garner support amongst artists, their
agents, and consumers means that the label will not constitute a barrier to entry
for the foreseeable future. In any case, the NIAAA and other authentication labels
are all voluntary schemes.
Unconscionable conduct and the nature of Indigenous
‘disability’
In the case of the Indigenous arts industry in remote Australia, artists may be
‘disabled’ by poor literacy, numeracy, substance abuse, their general lack
confidence in cross-cultural interactions, and poor understanding of unfamiliar and
relatively abstract concepts such as the ‘market’. If art dealers  take advantage of
these ‘disabilities’ they may be in breach of the TPA.
There are anecdotes in the industry about artists being invited to work for a dealer and
being trapped physically, emotionally or through their lack of knowledge about how
to extricate themselves from the situation. Artists appear especially vulnerable
when they are in an unfamiliar place, for example in an urban centre.
An artist who was in Sydney working for a dealer rang his relative in central
Australia telling the relative he was sick of being in Sydney, and that the
dealer would not let him leave and was refusing to arrange for him to return
to his community. Since the artist did not have the private means for a flight
home, he was now ringing relatives in an attempt to arrange to pay for a
flight. The plan was to surreptitiously catch a taxi to the airport to get home.
An artist was visiting Darwin as the guest of a privately organised festival of
weaving. She had been promised an airfare and a fee, but had arrived in
Darwin to find she was being hosted in the organiser’s house and was not
going to be paid a fee. She did not have any money and felt trapped, being
unable to organise anything independently.
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Certain art centres that are otherwise successful, face problems because their key
producers have a dependency on alcohol that private dealers are more than willing
to exploit by supplying alcohol and/or money to artists and their families as well as
arranging transport into town. Such exploitation debases the artists (and often
threatens the integrity of their art work), undermines the art centres, and
demoralises the art centre staff and other artist members.
A prominent and successful artist, who was promoted internationally by an
art centre for more than a decade, was encouraged to work on site for a
dealer in an urban centre in 2000. He did this for a period of months before
being ‘poached’ by another dealer. To the first dealer’s irritation, the new
arrangement was exclusive. It is rumoured that the second dealer provided a
number of ‘encouragements’ to the artist who has multiple substance
dependencies.
There are instances where artists have been provided with art materials by private
dealers, and have then been coerced to deliver a finished product. The most
difficult situations occur when the private dealers have been residing in the
community and are employed either in community organisations or in running
(non-arts related) businesses. The fact that the dealers are on site means they have
easy access to artists and can visit them in their homes or places of work  to
monitor output or to pressure artists to complete works. The activities of such
informal rent-seeking entrepreneurs raises ethical issues about people being
granted permits to live in an Indigenous community to undertake a specific task,
and then deciding that they will take advantage of their proximity to world-
renowned artists to begin dealing in art.
There is anecdotal evidence that when a prominent artist was in physical
decline associated with old age, her camp was visited by a range of dealers
who had supplied art materials with a view to securing her completed
works. The behaviour of some individuals was described as ‘coercive’. This
was despite all visitors being asked by her relatives and community staff to
desist from visiting because of her age and ill health. Her fragility and lack of
English language skills, plus her inherent cultural aversion to rudeness,
would have made it exceedingly difficult for her to assert her rights to
privacy.
False or misleading representations
Sections 52 and 53 of the TPA may be particularly relevant to the Indigenous arts
industry. For example, one of the key problems for art centres in dealing with the
commercial sector is the promulgation by the latter of false and misleading
information about artists and/or their products (Wright 1999: 21). There are many
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unpublished examples of galleries presenting art works with deceptive or
misleading information relating to materials, traditional use and the significance of
the objects.
In a gallery in Alice Springs a sales assistant was overheard telling customers
that an Arnhem Land painting on what appeared to be manufactured
‘Arches’ paper (imported from France) was created ‘100% by Aboriginal
artists’ and was painted on ‘paperbark paper’ made by the artists
themselves. To our knowledge no artists in Arnhem Land make their own
paper, although many paint on Eucalyptus bark—an entirely different
material to paper. The customers were also informed that the product was
painted entirely in ochres when the background was in fact gouache
(watercolour). On another occasion the gallery director was heard to tell
customers that a patchwork rug made from lambskin was a ‘traditional
piccaninny blanket’.
There is potential for the manufacturers of an authentically licensed product to
misrepresent the extent to which it is the work of an Indigenous artist if, for
example, the artwork was only partly produced by Indigenous artists or it was
created by Indigenous artists who did not have the customary authority to produce
the particular style (Fair Trading/Unfair Practices covered in TPA, Part V, ss. 51–
65A, see ACCC 2001b).
One case relating to potential misleading representation (ss. 52 and 53)
concerns the production of didgeridoos in  South Australia. Indigenous
people (supposedly) harvest raw woods in the Northern Territory which are
then trucked to Adelaide, where non-Aborigines strip the ‘blanks’ and fit
mouth pieces. The didgeridoos are then distributed to Indigenous painters
(from all over Australia) living in Adelaide who are paid a flat fee per item.
The instruments are then marketed as ‘Aboriginal made’, which to a limited
degree they are (Janke 1998: 39).
The carpets case previously discussed involved a breach of the TPA as well as
copyright law. Justice Von Doussa found that the label attached to the carpets
incorrectly stated that the carpets were produced with permission of the artists and
that royalties were being paid to the artists. He made the judgment that misleading
consumers in this way was an infringement of ss. 52 and 53 of the TPA (Janke
1998: 94).
In relation to false claims about authorship it is important to note the complex
nature of collaborations between Indigenous artists. The issue of authorship has
been problematic for dealers, art centres and the market because Indigenous artists
and their communities have a different concept of ‘ownership’ of designs to those
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held by the encapsulating culture. Rights to paint certain images and ‘dreamings’
belong to a group rather than an individual. Indigenous artists, unlike most
mainstream artists, work collaboratively on arts projects, and this practice has
continued with the introduction of paintings created for the market. The
participation in collaborations is determined by rights and responsibilities under
Indigenous law and is rarely random. The role of each participant in a collaborative
work varies depending upon rights and responsibilities of the participating
individuals. It may involve significant input to the content of the painting or may
be ‘decorative’.
In the case of Kathleen Petyarre and her former husband Ray Beamish, and
the painting that won the Telstra National Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Art Award in 1996, it was strongly argued by a number of people
that it was not necessary to acknowledge the collaboration because the
subject matter of the painting belonged to Petyarre. This was vindicated by
a panel convened to investigate the affair. The Chairman of the Board of the
Museums and Art Galleries of the Northern Territory ‘went on to note that
while it was not in dispute that Ray Beamish has assisted with some of the
dotting, ultimately this was not material to the decision in terms of what
constituted authorship of the painting’ (Nicholls & North 2001: 27).
There is a motivation for art centres and galleries to promote the work of
individual artists, rather than collaborations. The fine art consumer generally
has the expectation that artworks will hold or increase their value as
investments. The long-standing western practice has been for the works of
individual artists to be deemed collectable and for their works to steadily
appreciate in value. Dealers have articulated the view that the investment
art market is not receptive to collaborative works, even if they are culturally
appropriate in the Indigenous domain. The industry concern with multiple
authorship has not been satisfactorily resolved and no industry-wide
protocol has been developed to date. A Melbourne based art dealer and
artist was taken to court by members of Injalak Art Centre in 1994. An
Adelaide dealer had been approached by the first dealer who was selling
paintings by specific Kunwinjku artists as well as works from Central
Australia. The Adelaide dealer forwarded photographs of the paintings to
the art centre for verification, whereupon the artists acknowledged
authorship of some works, but rejected others. The disputed paintings were
of poor quality, derivative of the Western Arnhem Land style, and the
subject matter was not necessarily owned by the artists. The paintings that
the artists acknowledged authorship for were created during a residency
undertaken at the Melbourne dealer’s home organised directly with the
artists some months earlier. According to the artists, they all painted in the
dealer’s studio and produced a number of paintings on Arches paper during
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the residency. At the same time they gave the dealer lessons in their
traditional painting style as an expression of their respect and gratitude to
him as host. They were paid both in cash and in-kind for the paintings they
produced. The dealer did some painting under their supervision but did not
indicate his intention to sell his artwork, neither did he indicate his intention
to continue painting in the Kunwinjku style after their departure, nor his
intention to attribute their authorship to his own derivative paintings.
An employee of a Cairns artefact shop has been caught on video claiming
genuine Indigenous didgeridoos are inferior to fake Indonesian imports. The
local Indigenous community is calling for government action over claims
that cheap imported didgeridoos are flooding the million-dollar artefact
market while Indigenous people are being edged out by dealers. They say
that workers in Indonesia are paid at cheap rates to make the didgeridoos
and Aboriginal artists are being ripped off, being paid $50–$60 for genuine
didgeridoos which are then retailed for up to $800. ATSIC Cairns and
District chairman Terry O’Shane said that federal legislation was needed to
protect Aboriginal artwork. ‘Aboriginal authenticity must be protected by
law because our people are being hoodwinked and this reflects badly on the
integrity of Australia in terms of culture,’ he said. A spokesman for Fair
Trading Minister Merri Rose said an artefact’s country of origin must not be
misrepresented. Fines of $40 000 for individuals and $202 000 for
corporations could be implemented (Reid 2002).
Conclusions and implications for practice
The research reported here has focused on the Indigenous arts industry as a case
study of how competition and consumer protection issues might apply to an
industry dominated by Indigenous Australians. We found that this industry is
extraordinarily complex, especially given its relatively small overall size. This is
partly because a large proportion of producers (artists) reside in remote localities
and in circumstances that are culturally very different from the mainstream.
Consequently, there is often a considerable physical and cultural distance between
producers and consumers, with all the complications that such intercultural
exchange entails. The sheer diversity of the industry, in both production and
marketing, means that it would be extremely difficult to rigorously regulate, even
in situations where such regulation might be warranted.
The main policy response to this situation by government over the last 30 years has
been the gradual establishment of a network of community-controlled art centres
as subsidised intercultural mediating institutions—as the collectors and initial
marketers of Indigenous art. This policy instrument has most recently been used by
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ATSIC since the early 1990s as the major plank of its NACISS (Mercer 1997). These
established organisations operate most effectively as monopolies, primarily because
of market failure associated with remoteness, small size and dispersed artist
populations that are expensive to service. Paradoxically, it may be in the artists’
best interests to be serviced by these monopolistic organisations. This is partly
because of the poor track record and performance of many private dealers, with
much of the anecdotal evidence indicating conduct that might border on the
unconscionable. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, it could be argued that competition
per se may not assist the industry, at least as it is currently structured.
It is entirely possible that the ACCC may receive complaints from consumers,
producers or dealers within the Indigenous arts industry. It is our hope that this
chapter will assist the ACCC in understanding the complex nature of the industry
and particularly the nuances that need to be considered when looking at potential
articulation points between the industry and the TPA.
The approach taken in this research has been diverse: it has used the existing
literature, the research and experiences of the authors and an theoretical
economics framework that meshes with the intent of the TPA. This approach has
shortcomings. In particular, on the collection and marketing side—the supply
side—there is too much emphasis on formal institutions primarily because these are
most visible, both statistically and in the literature. To some extent, our findings
replicate many already historically reported in the literature (see e.g. Altman 1989)
and in some recently completed projects (see Janke 1998; Mellor 2001; Wright
1999; Wright & Morphy 2000). Where this research primarily differs from others is
in its use of a trade practices legislation lens to focus on the Indigenous arts
industry.
The trade practices issues that we have highlighted are, in order of their estimated
significance to the Indigenous arts industry, unconscionable conduct and false or
misleading representations.
Unconscionable conduct can occur in situations where private dealers are in a
stronger bargaining position than the Indigenous producer of art. The very fact
that such intrusion and conduct occurs, even in situations where there are
established community-controlled art centres, suggests that it is an actual and
potentially greater problem in more informal settings where arts collecting
institutions are absent. This issue has been evident since the establishment of the
modern Indigenous arts industry in the early 1970s. It should be noted though that
because artists are engaged in an exchange relationship they are rarely passive
parties in the transaction, although they may experience special disability especially
in those situations where they might experience extreme financial deprivation or
alcohol or drug dependence. In such situations they are especially vulnerable.
There is clearly a need for unconscionable conduct to be reduced or eliminated,
although it is problematic when individual artists make informed choices to use
dealers over established channels.
100 Competition and consumer issues for Indigenous Australians
c h a p t e r 4
False or misleading information can emanate from artists, art centres, retail outlets
or commercial dealers. It is important that consumers are confident, when they
make a purchase in either the fine or the tourist market, that they are getting
product made by Indigenous artists and, in the case of fine art, by a prominent
artist. The issues of authorship and authenticity can be distinguished. While there
are many situations where collective authorship of an artwork is culturally
appropriate, it is important that this is clearly documented to ensure that the
consumer is accurately informed. It is especially important that the authorship is
correctly recorded for works destined for the expanding fine art ‘investment’
market, where knowledgeable investors are prepared to pay a premium for the
work of recognised artists. The issue of authenticity is also complex. It
encompasses appropriation of certain geographically based styles, collaboration
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous artists, and competition from imported
and locally produced unlicensed ‘fakes’. All these issues exacerbate the potential
vulnerability of the Indigenous arts industry which, in many situations, represents
the main private sector option for economic development for Indigenous
communities.
We turn now to the question of what action the ACCC might contemplate in
respect to the trade practices issues identified.
There are no ready solutions to the problem of unconscionable conduct except,
perhaps, education of artists that encourages strong allegiance to accountable and
well-governed arts organisations. This in turn suggests that a broadening of the
network of community-controlled art centres might prove beneficial, but this is a
policy response that is clearly outside the ACCC’s ambit. It is also important to
emphasise that the governance issue here extends well beyond community-
controlled art centres—there may be systemic and deeply ingrained community
governance problems that make artists vulnerable to private dealers, some of
whom may be employed within communities. Nevertheless, the ACCC may wish to
keep a watching brief for interactions that might be classified as unconscionable
conduct, or as coercion or harassment under the TPA.
There are labelling statutes in force (e.g. through customs), particularly for
imported goods which must state country of origin. In recent years, documentation
strategies undertaken by many art centres and reputable commercial galleries have
improved markedly, but there is still competition from non-Indigenous products,
particularly in the tourist art sector. Fortunately, national and regional initiatives to
document art thoroughly and appropriately are contributing to enhancing
consumer confidence and have the potential to limit opportunities for unauthorised
fine art or imitation tourist art. There is a potential role for the ACCC here in
supporting art centre, regional and national initiatives especially in the problematic
tourist sector of the industry.
In April 2002 the ACCC and ATSIC signed an MoU which provides a framework
for cooperation between the agencies (ACCC 2002a). The ACCC, in consultation
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with ATSIC could play a constructive and proactive competition and consumer role
by assisting in the provision of producer, art centre, dealer, and consumer
information in particular in relation to issues of authorship, authenticity, copyright,
pricing policies and unconscionable conduct. A simplified guide or charter for
producers and consumers of Indigenous art might prove very useful in generating
producer and consumer benefit and industry growth. In April 2002 the ACCC
released Storecharter—a service charter for stores serving remote and Indigenous
communities (ACCC 2002b). A similar ‘Arts charter—a service charter for the
Indigenous arts industry’ might prove appropriate, especially to facilitate both
producer and consumer information, so as to reduce the risk of unconscionable
conduct and false or misleading conduct. The arts charter could be appropriately
developed with national arts advocacy or commercial galleries associations or, with
an eye to devolution, with regional arts advocacy organisations like ANKAAA or
Desart that more directly represent the community-controlled art centre
constituency.
